ResistanceThe fall of João Goulart radicalized student groups. Unable to mobilize poor Brazilians, student groups adopted direct action tactics, much like the Red Army Faction in West Germany in the 1970s.
The first signs of resistance were seen in 1968 with the appearance of widespread student protests. In response to this upsurge, the government issued Institutional Act Number Five in December 1968, which suspended habeas corpus, increased the power of the executive by shutting down the other branches of government, and declared a nationwide state of siege. Protests were suppressed with violence. The anti-military movement descended into the political underground and eventually armed action.
By the end of the decade there were twenty organizations involved in the urban guerrilla movement. The old-left, particularly in the shape of the Brazilian Communist Party, was seen as irrelevant and outdated, as Marxist-Leninist, Maoist, Trotskyist, Castroist, and all the other shades of left-wing ideology competed for the loyalty of the young militants, especially in places like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Recruitment drives were carried out in schools and universities, initially with lectures in Marxist theory. The most determined were drawn deeper into activism, some making the decision to leave their families and go underground altogether.
In 1969 the Revolutionary Movement October 8 kidnapped Charles Burke Elbrick, the U.S. ambassador to Brazil. The rebels demanded the release of imprisoned dissidents in exchange for Ambassador Elbrick. The government responded by adopting more brutal measures of counter-insurgency, leading to the assassination of Carlos Marighela, a guerrilla leader, two months after Elbrick's kidnapping. This marked the beginning of the decline of armed resistance. In 1970, Nobuo Okuchi, Japanese consul general in Sāo Paulo, was kidnapped, while Curtis C. Cutter, U.S. consul in Porto Alegre, was wounded in the shoulder but escaped kidnapping. Also in 1970, Ehren von Holleben, West German Ambassador, was kidnapped in Rio and one of his bodyguards was killed.
According to a government-sponsored truth and reconciliation commission in 2007, by the end of the 21 years of dictatorship there were 339 documented cases of government-sponsored political assassinations or disappearances. More were questioned, tortured, and jailed.
DiplomacyThe military regime introduced new domestic political restrictions, sharpened during the second mandate in 1967, under the command of Marshal Costa e Silva. In 1967 the name of the country was changed from Republic of the United States of Brazil to Federative Republic of Brazil. Meanwhile, Brazil's international agenda incorporated new perceptions. With nationalist military segments — who were also State-control devotees — in power, there was increased scope for the return of concerns questioning the disparities of the international system.
Interest in expanding state presence in the economy was accompanied by policies intended to transform Brazil's profile abroad. The relationship with the United States was still valued, but alignment was no longer comprehensive. Connections between Brazilian international activity and its economic interests led foreign policy, conducted by foreign minister José de Magalhães Pinto (1966–67), to be labeled "Prosperity Diplomacy."
This new emphasis of Brazil's international policy was followed by an appraisal of relations maintained with the United States in the previous year. It was observed that the attempted strengthening of ties had yielded limited benefits. A revision of the Brazilian ideological stand within the world system was added to this perception. This state of affairs was further enhanced by the momentary emptying of the bipolar confrontation in view of détente.
In this context, it became possible to think of substituting the concept of limited sovereignty for plain sovereignty. Development was made a priority for Brazilian diplomacy. These conceptual transformations were supported by the younger segments of Itamaraty, identified with the tenets of the independent foreign policy that had distinguished the early 1960s.
Based on the priorities of its foreign policy, Brazil adopted new positions in various international organizations. Its performance at the II Conference of UNCTAD in 1968, in defense of non-discriminatory and preferential treatment for underdeveloped countries' manufactured goods, was noteworthy. The same level of concern distinguished the Brazilian stand at the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) meeting in Viña del Mar (1969). On this occasion, Brazil voiced its support of a Latin American union project.
In the security sphere, disarmament was defended and the joint control system of the two superpowers condemned. Brazil was particularly judgmental of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with a view to guarantee the right to develop its own nuclear technology. This prerogative had already been defended previously, when the Brazilian government decided not to accept the validity of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TNP) in Latin America and the Caribbean. Brazil's position on the TNP became emblematic of the negative posture that it would, from then onwards, sustain regarding the power politics of the United States and the Soviet Union. Its initial detailing was influenced by the presence of Araújo Castro as ambassador to the UN and president of the Security Council in the years 1968-69.
Simultaneously, Brazil tried to strengthen its position with nuclear cooperation negotiated settlements with countries such as Israel (1966), France (1967), India (1968) and the United States (1972).
The changes in Brazilian diplomacy were to be also reflected in other matters on the international agenda, such as the moderate stance taken with regard to the "Six-Day War" between Arabs and Israelis. In the multilateral sphere, the country championed the cause of the reform of the United Nations Organization charter.
Third military governmentThe third military government (1969–74), led by general Emilio Garrastazu Médici and guided by directives already adopted in the previous period, intensified the transformation process of Brazil's foreign relations. At the same time, as domestic politics hardened, the scope of the country's foreign influence contracted.
The decreeing of Institutional Act #5 (AI-5, 1968) marked a new phase of political freedom restrictions in Brazil. The succession of kidnappings of foreign ambassadors in Brazil embarrassed the military government. The anti-government manifestations and the action of guerrilla movements generated an increase in repressive measures. The "ideological frontiers" of Brazilian foreign policy were reinforced. By the end of 1970, the official minimum wage went down to US$40/month, and the more than than one-third of Brazilian workforce which had their wages tied to it lost about 50% of its purchasing power in relation to the 1960 levels[3] at the end of the Juscelino Kubitscheck administration.
At the same time, the results of the economic policy consolidated the option for the national-development model. Because of these results, the country’s foreign economic connections were transformed, allowing its international presence to be broadened.
Geisel administration, distensão, and the 1973 oil shockIt was in this atmosphere that retired General Ernesto Geisel (1974–79) came to the presidency with Médici's approval. There had been intense behind-the-scenes maneuvering by the hard-liners against him and by the more moderate supporters of Castelo Branco for him. Fortunately for Geisel, his brother, Orlando Geisel, was the minister of army, and his close ally, General João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo, was chief of Médici's military staff.
Although not immediately understood by civilians, Ernesto Geisel's accession signaled a move toward a less oppressive rule. Geisel replaced several regional commanders with trusted officers and labeled his political program distensão, meaning a gradual relaxation of authoritarian rule. It would be, in his words, "the maximum of development possible with the minimum of indispensable security."
President Geisel sought to maintain high economic growth rates, even while seeking to deal with the effects of the oil shocks. He kept up massive investments in infrastructure — highways, telecommunications, hydroelectric dams, mineral extraction, factories, and atomic energy. Fending off nationalist objections, he opened Brazil to oil prospecting by foreign firms for the first time since the early 1950s.
Brazil suffered drastic reductions in its terms of trade as a result of the 1973 world oil shock. In the early 1970s, the performance of the export sector was undermined by an overvalued currency. With the trade balance under pressure, the oil shock led to a sharply higher import bill. Thus, the Geisel government borrowed billions of dollars to see Brazil through the oil crisis. This strategy was effective in promoting growth, but it also raised Brazil's import requirements markedly, increasing the already large current-account deficit. The current account was financed by running up the foreign debt. The expectation was that the combined effects of import-substitution industrialization and export expansion eventually would bring about growing trade surpluses, allowing the service and repayment of the foreign debt.
Brazil shifted its foreign policy to meet its economic needs. "Responsible pragmatism" replaced strict alignment with the United States and a worldview based on ideological frontiers and blocs of nations. Because Brazil was 80% dependent on imported oil, Geisel shifted the country from an acritical support of Israel to a more neutral stance on Middle Eastern affairs. His government also recognized the People's Republic of China and the new governments of Angola and Mozambique. The government moved closer to Latin America, Europe, and Japan. The 1975 agreement with West Germany to build nuclear reactors produced confrontation with the Carter administration, which also scolded the Geisel government for abusing human rights. Frustrated with what he saw as the highhandedness and lack of understanding of the Carter administration, Geisel renounced the military alliance with the United States in April 1977.
In 1977 and 1978 the succession issue caused further political confrontations with the hard-liners. Noting that Brazil was only a "relative democracy," Geisel attempted in April 1977 to restrain the growing strength of the opposition parties by creating an electoral college that would approve his selected replacement. In October he dismissed the far-right minister of army, General Sylvio Couto Coelho da Frota. In 1978 Geisel maneuvered through the first labor strikes since 1964 and through the repeated electoral victories of the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro — MDB). He allowed exiled citizens to return, restored habeas corpus, repealed the extraordinary powers decreed by the Fifth Institutional Act, and imposed General João Figueiredo (1979–85) as his successor in March 1979.
According to the Comissão de Direitos Humanos e Assistência Jurídica da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, the "Brazilian death toll from government torture, assassination and 'disappearences' for 1964–81 was [...] 333, which included 67 killed in the Araguaia guerrilla front in 1972–74".[8] According to the Brazilian Army 97 military and civilians were killed by terrorist and guerrilla actions made by leftist groups during the same period.[9]
The military presidents:
Castelo Branco
Arthur da Costa Silva
Emilio Garrastazu Médici
Ernesto Geisel
João Batista de Oliveira Figueiredo
Have more military presidents, but I selected this pictures
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I hope you enjoyed and learned about these dictatorships. Thanks
